IANS Analysis: Is PLA facing distrust of Chinese Communist Party?

New Delhi: This year, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone significant changes, including purges and restructuring efforts.

Since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, the PLA, the world’s largest military force, has been under his ‘modernisation’ programme, aiming to transform into a fully modern military power by 2027.

This modernisation plan involves the development of advanced military hardware, including modern drones, missiles, fighter jets, and warships. This intent is also reflected in this year’s defence budget of $231.36 billion, marking a 7.2 per cent increase for the third consecutive year.

However, Xi’s ambitious plans have coincided with a rise in corruption cases within the PLA, notably involving top-level officials, a first in Communist China’s history. This situation raises the question: does corruption within the PLA signify a legitimacy issue for Xi Jinping, and is this why he harbours distrust towards the PLA?

Since assuming office in 2012, corruption has been a significant challenge for the Chinese President. Xi Jinping initiated an anti-corruption campaign by establishing the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), positioning it as the primary body to investigate corruption within the Communist Party.

This campaign extended even to senior military officials, as Xi pledged to target both "tigers and flies." Consequently, the number of prosecutions against high-ranking officers increased sharply following the CCDI's inception in 2013.

The campaign's severity is evident from the removal of over 100 senior PLA officials from their posts in 2017 alone. Additionally, the CCDI is believed to have purged a total of 294 senior PLA officials to date. There was a 40 per cent rise in corruption investigations last year compared to the previous year, including 45 senior officials, of whom 27 are retired.

Investigations of corruption cases involving military officials in China are typically conducted behind closed doors. The sudden purges and disappearances of senior officials, particularly notable since last year, indicate the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) preference for keeping graft cases within the PLA, which directly pledges allegiance to the CCP, under wraps.

Former Defence Minister Li Shangfu vanished from public view for two months, with his removal only being officially announced seven months after his appointment as Defence Minister in March 2023.

A month prior to this announcement, eight other senior officials were reported to be under investigation for suspected faulty arms procurement, although the CCP provided no official explanation. Subsequently, the removal of nine senior PLA officials was announced, again without any explanation.

The purges and abrupt replacements of Commander Li Yuchao, Commissar Xu Zhongbo, and deputies Li Guangbin and Zhang Zhenzhong of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) on suspected embezzlement and espionage charges since June last year further highlight the deep-rooted graft within Xi's PLA.

Last month, former Defence Ministers Wei Fenghe (2018-2023) and Li Shangfu (March-October 2023) were dismissed on charges of “serious violations of discipline and law” (corruption), including seeking personal benefits, resisting investigation, and accepting large bribes.

Both ministers were not only stripped of their military ranks but also expelled from their positions in the party. The other eight senior officials purged in September last year were also expelled from their National People’s Congress membership.

This implies that these former officials could face imprisonment if found guilty of the criminal charges against them, as they no longer have the immunity provided by their NPC membership.

Significantly, the positions held by those purged from the PLA are of interest. As previously mentioned, top officials of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), including Commander Li Yuchao, Commissar Xu Zhongbo, and Deputies Li Guangbin and Zhang Zhenzhong, were removed from their roles last year. Former Defence Minister Wei Fenghe also served as PLARF’s first commander. The frequency of these purges indicates that PLARF has become a focal point for corruption.

PLARF, an elite military branch, oversees the PLA’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which Xi Jinping has described as the “core of strategic deterrence, a strategic support to the country's major power status, and a foundation for national security.”

Xi’s New Year message, envisioning China’s reunification “on both sides of the Taiwan Strait” in line with his goal of ‘Chinese rejuvenation,’ alongside escalating territorial disputes in the South China Sea this year, suggests his intention of possibly engaging in future conflicts for territorial gains.

Therefore, the role of PLARF is more critical than ever, and the surge in corruption cases poses a hindrance to Xi’s ambitions. This is reflected in his emphasis on the need for party self-reform in his political doctrine. Li Shangfu, before becoming Defence Minister, headed the PLA’s Equipment Development Department (2017-2022). Issues in China’s defence procurement have been cited as reasons for the recent purges.

According to a 2018 study by China’s Naval University of Engineering, the PLA’s equipment procurement was involved in ‘bid rigging’ practices, negatively impacting the PLA’s combat capabilities.

A US intelligence report highlighted instances of Chinese missiles filled with water instead of fuel, making them ineffective for launching, and entire fields of silos with improper lids in Western China, showcasing how corruption in the Chinese military is undermining Xi’s military modernisation efforts.

In this context, the replacement of the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) with the Information Support Force (ISF) in April is significant. Established by Xi Jinping in 2015, the PLA SSF was part of an effort to reform the PLA, alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, all commanded by full theatre-grade generals.

As a combat force prioritising national security, the SSF integrated cyber, space, electronic, and psychological warfare. However, the restructuring of the SSF into the ISF is believed to be driven by potential corruption cases.

General Ju Qiansheng, former SSF Commander, and Lieutenant General Shang Hong, former SSF Deputy Commander, disappeared from public view earlier this year, raising suspicions that their absences may be linked to corruption investigations.

The transition to the ISF represents a subtle shift in Xi’s military strategy. With the establishment of the ISF, the PLA now comprises four services; Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—and four branches—aerospace, cyberspace, ISF, and Joint Logistic Support Force.

The ISF was created to enhance informationisation as a new strategic arm of the PLA, tasked with building a network information system to meet modern warfare requirements. However, unlike the SSF’s leader, the new ISF head, Lieutenant General Bi Yi, is of deputy-theatre-command-leader grade, which appears to be a demotion in rank.

The purges within the PLA and Xi Jinping’s unwavering objective to eradicate corruption highlight a disruption in the stability of his leadership. This poses a significant challenge for the Chinese President at a time when his territorial ambitions in Taiwan and the South China Sea are at their peak, necessitating not only the enhanced combat capability of the PLA but also loyal and obedient officials ready to engage in warfare at his command.

However, disloyalty among PLA members has been another obstacle, as seen in the case of General Liu Yazhou, a senior Air Force Commander, who faced a death sentence for “serious economic corruption” after expressing disagreement with Xi's military aggression policy regarding Taiwan.

These military purges can thus be interpreted as Xi's way of punishing dissenters within the PLA, reflecting his leadership instability and failure to appoint loyalists to top positions despite his personal endorsement.

The placement of the ISF under the direct control of the Central Military Commission, China’s top military body headed by Xi, is intended to enhance his oversight of factions within the PLA.

Xi aims for the ISF to “resolutely obey the party’s command” and ensure its members remain “absolutely loyal, pure, and reliable.” Therefore, the purges and subsequent restructuring within the PLA are rooted in Xi’s issues of legitimacy and his distrust of the PLA.

Source: IANS